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A REPLY TO PROFESSOR TOBIAS
PETER A. APPEL
In his response to my article, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The
Environmental Paradigm, 1 Professor Carl Tobias finds much to commend
and much to criticize, and he offers a “friendly critique” of my article.2 I
thank Professor Tobias for taking the time to respond to my article, and I
hope that this response furthers the dialogue on this important subject.
Professor Tobias finds four primary faults with my account. First, he
believes that I rely too heavily on impressionistic and anecdotal data in
formulating my conclusions, although he recognizes that all analyses of
intervention— his own included— suffer from the same fault.3 Second, he
argues that my article and other considerations of this area would benefit
from “a more refined understanding of modern environmental litigation.”4
Third, Professor Tobias expresses doubt about the wisdom of my
prescriptions for improving intervention, particularly with my argument that
courts of appeals should review intervention denials under an abuse of
discretion standard rather than de novo.5 Fourth, and finally, he argues that
my article “clings too substantially to a private law view of environmental
litigation and participation in it.”6 I will deal with each of these criticisms in
turn.
I agree with Professor Tobias that everyone’s analysis of problems
concerning intervention would benefit from hard statistical data regarding
rates of participation, and I share his concerns that such data would prove
difficult to gather and analyze. Although one can postulate in a quantitative
model demonstrating the point at which additional intervenors would prove
counterproductive,7 simply determining the units with which to measure the
burden that additional intervenors create would defy even the most patient
data collector. I agree with Professor Tobias that any such study, to be useful,
1. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U.L.Q. 215 (2000).
2. See Carl Tobias, Rethinking Intervention in Environmental Litigation, 78 WASH. U.L.Q. 313
(2000) [hereinafter, Tobias, Rethinking Intervention]. My article criticized earlier works of Professor
Tobias. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 270 (1989); Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415 [hereinafter Tobias,
Standing to Intervene].
3. See Tobias, Rethinking Intervention, supra note 2, at 314-15.
4. Id. at 315.
5. See id. at 316-17.
6. Id. at 318.
7. See Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency
of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978).
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would have to compare data from circuits that review district court
intervention decisions de novo and those that review it for abuses of
discretion. For reasons I suggested in my article, however, the incentive
structure of intervention decisionmaking tilts in favor of granting intervention
regardless of the standard of review applied.8 A proper study would have to
comb through not only all of the instances in which a district court denied
intervention and the decision was appealed, but all instances in which
someone applied for intervention and the district court simply granted it.
There are undoubtedly many instances in which a district court judge hastily
scribbles “Granted” on the cover page of an intervention motion or asks a
law clerk to draft a terse order granting a motion. Moreover, the most useful
data to inform the debate between Professor Tobias and me would consist of
results from cases involving public law litigation, particularly environmental
public law litigation. Ideally, this data set would divide out the different types
of environmental public law litigation that I describe in my article9 and show
how intervention plays out in each. Needless to say, it will be a long time
before someone takes the time to assemble such quality data.
Even if someone were to complete such a study, Professor Tobias and I
must face the real possibility that the study will be inconclusive. For
example, a recent study of amicus curiae participation in the Supreme
Court— one that analyzes every argued Supreme Court case over the last fifty
years, tabulates the instances of amicus participation, and identifies certain
institutional participants and monitors their success rates— reaches only
cautious conclusions.10 If that were the result from empirical analysis of
intervention in district courts, Professor Tobias and I would still face the
debate we face now, namely, the extent to which district courts should allow
intervention and the extent to which courts of appeals should force district
courts to allow intervention. That debate must, at some level, be informed by
impressions.
In his second criticism, Professor Tobias argues that my article lacks a
sufficiently refined understanding of modern environmental litigation. As I
8. See Appel, supra note 1, at 292-95.
9. See id. at 224-39.
10. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 750 (2000). To the extent that lessons learned in the amicus
context inform the debate over intervention between Professor Tobias and I, Kearney and Merrill tend
to support Professor Tobias’s view— stated most prominently in Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra
note 2, at 447-48— that institutional intervenors tend to assist litigation more than other intervenors.
Kearney and Merrill find that these amicus participants show a higher success rate than other amicus
participants. See Kearney & Merrill, supra, at 801-11. However, this success rate also supports my
argument that amicus participation can often effectively replace participation as an intervenor. See
Appel, supra note 1, at 308-09.
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recognized in my article, however, “not all environmental cases are alike.”11 I
agree with Professor Tobias that many differences separate the challenge to a
rulemaking under the Clean Air Act and a challenge to a specific timber sale
in a national forest.12 Courts ought to treat motions to intervene in different
cases differently. As I have argued, however, they presently tend not to do
so. Instead, courts tend to treat applications for intervention similarly
regardless of the underlying substance of the case. They not only do this
regardless of the underlying purposes of a statute— which Professor Tobias
regards as the “touchstone of analysis” in most situations13— but also without
regard to the unique attributes of the litigation before them. Further, as I
argued in my article, courts tend to treat intervention motions in
environmental cases much as they would treat intervention motions in civil
rights cases.14 Thus, Professor Tobias and I agree that courts must develop a
more nuanced appreciation for the underlying legal problems in the particular
cases before them.
Third, Professor Tobias expresses some caution about my suggestions for
how to improve intervention. He disagrees with my suggestion that courts of
appeals that now review intervention decisions de novo review intervention
denials under an abuse of discretion standard. Professor Tobias believes that
this would vest too much authority in an individual (namely the district court
judge), who in many instances will be overworked and will face intervention
applications from an unpopular organization or one that will protract the
proceedings.15 Although this is the predictable criticism voiced against the
abuse of discretion standard, it avoids the question of why district courts
should enjoy discretion in other more important areas. Two examples
mentioned in my article come to mind. First, district courts enjoy discretion
on whether to enter injunctive relief and the scope of that relief.16 Second,
district courts enjoy discretion in deciding whether to dismiss an action
altogether for the failure of the parties to join an indispensible party.17 It
seems odd to trust a single decisionmaker to formulate the ultimate decree
and to decide whether the action should proceed at all, but not to trust that
same decisionmaker to decide whether to admit another party to litigation,
11. Appel, supra note 1, at 238.
12. See Tobias, Rethinking Intervention, supra note 2, at 315.
13. Id. at 316.
14. See Appel, supra note 1, at 234-39.
15. See Tobias, Rethinking Intervention, supra note 2, at 316-17.
16. See Appel, supra note 1, at 305.
17. See id. at 305-06. The relevant rule of civil procedure is FED. R. CIV. P. 19. Professor Tobias
has written about this aspect of Rule 19. See Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to
Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REV. 745 (1987).
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especially when the value of adding that additional party is indeterminate.
Fourth and finally, Professor Tobias believes that “it is simply too late in
the day to consider environmental cases as bipolar disputes between two
private parties.”18 I agree. I recognize that much of modern environmental
litigation cannot be viewed as consisting of bipolar disputes; my lengthy
discussion of the salmon litigation in the Pacific Northwest demonstrates that
understanding.19 Professor Tobias and I also agree that complex
environmental litigation fits within Chayes’s theoretical construct of what
constitutes public law litigation.20 Our disagreement, then, turns on who
should have the power to insert themselves into the litigation. Chayes himself
argued that one of the central features of public law litigation was its
potential to have wide-reaching effects on nonparties.21 Contrary to Professor
Tobias, I do not believe that intervenors in many cases make additions that
warrant their participation. Courts have other ways of accomplishing the
same ends that intervenors promise to bring— courts can, for example, call
their own expert witnesses or appoint special masters if the facts are
complex— without the attendant problems of delay or bias that having an
intervenor can bring. Although public participation is undoubtedly important
in modern environmental decisionmaking, public participation frequently
takes place at the administrative level and need not necessarily take the form
of formally admitting an intervenor as a party.
In sum, if Professor Tobias and I were appointed to the bench and were
faced with similar cases, we would likely decide some of them the same way.
There would undoubtedly be cases in which we would both grant motions for
intervention and cases in which we would both deny motions. There would
likely be a large number of public law cases in which Judge Tobias would
grant intervention motions but limit the extent of the participation, and Judge
Appel would deny intervention motions but entertain briefs from amici
curiae. In many instances the difference between these two approaches
would be negligible. In my view, the flexibility that would allow Judge
18. Tobias, Rethinking Intervention, supra note 2, at 318.
19. See Appel, supra note 1, at 227-38.
20. Thus, Professor Tobias and I are not engaging in a debate similar to the one over whether
mass tort litigation constitutes public law litigation. Compare Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation:
Paradigm Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 580-82 (1994), and Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving
Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999)
(arguing that mass tort litigation is not within public law litigation paradigm), with David Rosenberg,
The Causal Connection in Mass Tort Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984), and Jack B Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 469, 472-75 (arguing that mass tort cases fit within public law litigation paradigm).
21. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1302 (1976).
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Tobias and Judge Appel to reach these different decisions is an important
part of the vision underlying public law litigation. I come to this enterprise no
enemy of public law litigation or of intervenors. I believe, however, that the
practice of intervention in public law litigation can be improved over its
present state.
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